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Footnote There are some differences in concept between cooperation, coordination and collaboration.
Coordination is a process to link each activity without any inherent value (“I do it because I am told to do so).
No feeling and no vision. Cooperation is a voluntary action by two players to link each area of supply chain
since the two players see some value for their own company in terms of cost, price and profit (“I do it because
I see some immediate benefits for me”). Collaboration is a process of creating value for the entire players along
the supply chain. Price and cost seldom enter into this process (“I do it because I see a long-term value for me
and for my organization. It fosters creating trust and produce “serial equity” as opposed to “spot equity”).
(Pekman, Kamauff, and Myhr, 1998).
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HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN DESIGN FOR SUSTAINABLE
OPERATIONS: INVESTING IN PREPAREDNESS STAGE OF
OPERATIONS
Ik-Whan G. Kwon, Saint Louis University
Sung-Ho Kim, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea

Between the years of 2000 and 2012, natural disasters caused $1.7 trillion in damage and
affected 2.9 billion people (dosomething.org). In the Americas (ranked second globally in
terms of natural disasters) between 2007 and 2016, disasters caused 255,033 deaths, 898,816
injuries and damages worth $470 billion (Disasters, 2017). In 2016 alone, natural disasters
caused $175 billion in damage with 8,700 lives (Munich RE, 2017). The above numbers reflect
only the amount of physical destruction and do not include indirect losses such as
unemployment, environmental consequences, and business disruptions. Therefore, the full
impact of these catastrophic events is much greater than these numbers suggest. Response to
and management of disaster relief supply chain is considered different from that of
commercial supply chain/logistics in many aspects. This paper argues that investment in the
preparedness phase is much more effective than spending on the operation side of relief
efforts. This paper proposes a new humanitarian supply chain design with emphasis on
investing in an infrastructural phase of humanitarian supply chain.

Keywords: Rules of Engagement, Humanitarian Supply Chain, Supply Chain Optimization,
Impartiality, Neutrality

INTRODUCTION
Data from EM-DAT (2012), the international disaster database, suggests an alarming
upwards trend of the number of natural disasters occurring worldwide over the last fifty years.
From 1965-1975 there were approximately 71 occurrences of natural disasters per year
worldwide. However, if we take that same ten year span from 1995-2005, we get an average of
approximately 403 natural disaster occurrences per year. That is a little more than five and a half
times what it was only twenty years earlier. Eleven percent (11%) of the people in the natural
disaster areas lives in developing countries, but the disasters occurring in developing countries
account for 53% of the recorded deaths (Kovacs & Spens, 2011). If damages caused by political
conflicts (war, terrorist attacks, etc.) are considered, the economic and human suffering would
exceed far more than information provided above.
Although humanitarian crises happen every year around the globe, it is not an easy task to
forecast the exact locations, time and magnitude/scale of such disasters making long range relief
planning and corresponding responses difficult and inefficient at best. Donor’s reluctance in
investing in humanitarian relief infrastructure coupled with unpredictable occurrences increase
the relief efforts more than necessary (Heaslip, 2012). It appears that donors are more willing to
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donate goods and money in response to urgent pleas by international relief agencies on a case by
case episode. Once such urgency subsidies, donors in many cases withdraw their pledge and in
some instances, not willing to fulfill their original pledge. One NGO reports that in 2015 only
53% of pledges were collected ($10.9 billion out of $19.8 billion pledged) (ICVA, 2017). In the
refuge crises in Darfur, Western Sudan and after hurricane Mitch, for example, aid agencies
received only a third of the pledged funds (Oloruntoba, 2005). Of pledged, in many instances,
the amount is too small with the wrong kind of materials that are practically useless in reducing
human suffering (United Nation Department of Humanitarian Affair, 1993). In some cases, the
assistance fund met only 10% of the estimated needs (Haavisto, Kovacs, & Spens, 2016).
Finally, many materials donated are misplaced due to an absence of well-thought out planning or
lack of logistics personnel. Some experts plead that “we do not need a donor’s conference rather
we need a logistician conference.” (Shane & Bonner, 2005).
Some experts may argue that humanitarian supply chain/logistics is fundamentally
different from that of commercial supply chain/logistics, and, therefore operations of these two
supply chain models produce different outcomes and should not expect the same results. This
paper, however, will argue that the operational principles are the same and therefore outcomes
should be same on the different measuring areas (e.g. profits vs. saving lives) (ICVA, 2017).
The purpose of this paper is to outline a comprehensive humanitarian supply
chain/logistics design employing a commercial supply chain/logistics framework. Emphasis,
however, will be directed to the preparatory stage of supply chain operations in relief efforts.
Studies show that a well-prepared infrastructure in prepared stages is much more effective in
saving lives than investing money and materials in the operational phase of relief effort (Pettit, et
al., 2011).
This paper is organized as follows; 1. Introduction, 2. Literature review in humanitarian
supply chain/logistics, 3. Designing humanitarian supply chain, 4 Summary and conclusion, 5.
Agenda for future study in humanitarian supply chain/logistics.
LITERATURE REVIEW IN HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN/LOGISTICS
Since it is claimed that the disaster relief effort is about 60 to 80 percent logistics, one
could speculate that the best way to achieve the goals is through efficient and effective logistics
operations systems and supply chain management (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Therefore, building
humanitarian logistics capacity and operational effectiveness has formed a critical foundation of
global humanitarian relief effort undertaken by the international community. The speed of
humanitarian aid after a disaster depends on the ability of logisticians to buy, transport and
receive supplies at the site of humanitarian relief efforts (Thomas, 2005).
Humanitarian logistics in general can be defined as “the process of planning,
implementing and controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and
materials, as well as related information, from the point of origin (sourcing, warehousing and
distribution centers) to the point of consumption (disaster area) for the purpose of alleviating the
suffering of vulnerable people. The function, therefore, encompasses a range of activities,
including preparedness, planning, procurement, packaging, transport, warehousing, tracking and
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tracing, and custom clearances (Thomas & Kopczak, 2005). Apte (2009) is more specific in
defining humanitarian logistics in his attempt to bridge the humanitarian logistics to supply chain
management: humanitarian logistics is that special branch of logistics which manages response
supply chain of critical supplies and services with challenges such as demand surges, uncertain
supplies, and critical time window in the face of infrastructure vulnerabilities.
A. Rules of Engagement
Humanitarian supply chain/logistics, unlike commercial supply chain, operates under and
within four very important and unique set of principles. The humanitarian supply chain should be
based on; humanity, neutrality, independence and impartiality. Humanity aims at delivering
assistance without discrimination based on religion, political ideologies, race, and social values.
Neutrality, on the other hand, refers to the provision of aid without taking sides in a conflict
caused by political, social, religion or any other reasons. Humanitarian aid is based on
humanitarian needs only for basic necessities such as food, water, and shelter, clothing and
medical treatment. As such, there is no room for discrimination based on political ideologies.
Impartiality implies that action is based on a need base alone. Humanitarian assistance preconditioned based on political and social change should not be tolerated and rejected under this
principle. Finally, independence mandates a complete separation from political, economic, and
military intervention when delivering relief items and services. The independence principle
mandates no military or coercive conditions to be imposed as a condition of receiving
humanitarian aid (Seipel, 2011). Smith (2007) called these principles the basic rules of
engagement for NGOs, providing them with a mandate and framework of references under
which to operate, as well as influencing the degree of cooperation with other personnel in
governments, military organizations or religious institutes.
B. Three Stages of Operations
Humanitarian relief operations cover three phases of engagement; preparatory stage (Stage
1), response to urgent needs (Stage 2) and reconstruction (Stage 3) (Kovacs & Spens, 2007,
italics added). Uncertain funding sources, amount and timing by potential donors make long term
planning in Stage 1 difficult if not impossible. A sudden influx of goods in response to disasters
sometimes overwhelms the supply chain operations clogging distribution channels and
hampering overall relief operations. Furthermore, inappropriate aid materials (e.g. winter
blankets in Bangkok Flood in 2007) were clogging warehouses and distribution centers
hampering speedy distribution of critical materials to the needed areas/regions. One United
Nation report states that “… consistently, many of the internationally supplied relief goods flown
into countries… prove to be inappropriate and unnecessary… and may even be a barrier to more
important deliveries.” (United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1993).
C. Investing in Preparedness Stage (Stage 1)
Adequate funding in Stage 1 is very important and usually determines how quickly and
efficiently an aid agency can respond to some disaster areas (Jahre & Heigh, 2008). It has been
shown that a $1 investment in Stage 1 usually creates $3 worth of value in relief operations
(Stage 2) (Haavisto, Kovacs, & Spens, 2016). Nevertheless, most, if not all, relief responses have
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been focused on and around Stage 2 where the donors’ contributions are greatly exposed to the
global news media. Once such urgency fades away or political interest is low, aid inflow usually
either stops or is not honored (Comes & de Walle, 2016; Oloruntoba, 2005; ICVA, 2017). Case
can be made that sound investment in supply chain infrastructure (Stage 1) will minimize the
extent of damage and human suffering during relief operations (Stage 2). It is debatable whether
reconstruction (Stage 3) is within the realm of humanitarian relief supply chain. Humanitarian
relief effort is a response to onset disaster where capacity of local resources, personnel and
infrastructure are unable to minimize human suffering. Once such disasters are
controlled/managed and basic infrastructures are restored, the reconstruction phase should be left
to the local governments and communities since the requirements for reconstruction is quite
different from that of responding to relieving on-set disaster (Stage 2).
D. Foundation of Supply Chain
The foundation of supply chain rests upon information sharing. Information sharing
usually leads to trust among partners who in turn build avenues where collaborative initiative can
be commenced (Kwon & Suh, 2004 and 2005). Supply chain vision based on a sound foundation
enables the players to execute supply chain tools more efficiently and effectively to achieve the
ultimate corporate goals; profit and revenue. Recent research indicates supply chain optimization
based on a strong collaborative foundation improves overall performance measured by financial
metrics such as revenue, profit, shareholder’s return (Kwon, Hong, & Hamilton, 2012; Henke,
Stalkamp, & Yeniyurt, 2014; Partidas, 2015; Kwon, Hong, & Kim, 2017; Saenz, Gupta, &
Makowski, 2017). A similar argument can be made that humanitarian supply chain built on a
strong foundation may result in better outcomes in terms of reducing human suffering.
Commercial supply chain operates under a competitive environment where innovation and
entrepreneurial spirit guides their journey. The rules of engagement in humanitarian supply
chain, on the other hand, are bound by four principles that may limit and, in some instance, may
compromise the relief efforts.
E. Building Relationship
One of the most important areas missing in humanitarian supply chain/logistics is the
avenue and opportunity where collaborative process can be initiated.
Under such situation, long term strategic planning is almost impossible in the humanitarian
supply chain/logistics area. Lack of long term planning tends to deprive opportunities where a
serious relationship building platform can be initiated between donors and NGOs and NGOs and
recipients. Nevertheless, coordination, cooperation and collaboration among stakeholders are
imperative in relief supply chain to realize a maximum benefit out of chaotic situations a.
When circumstance is not tenable for the relationship building process, a “swift trust”
model is suggested as the second-best alternative (Tatham & Kovacs, 2011). The concept of
swift trust is based on circumstances where a hastily formed cooperative network (HFN) is
tentatively formed among players to maximize the relief efforts. HFN has fundamental elements
that provide a basic platform where initial coordination and cooperation can be formed that may
ultimately and hopefully lead to collaborative agreements in the long run. Unfortunately, HFN is
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a short-term concept with no sustainable prospective. Absence of sustainable operations may
cause redundant processes in each on-set disaster relief theater that wastes scarce resources.
A lack of sustainable dialogue among and between major players (mostly donors and
NGOs on behalf of recipients of aid) precipitates inefficient and ineffective resource allocations
in urgently needed areas. Under this circumstance, long term strategic planning is very
challenging and an attempt to create reasonable/measurable key performance indicators (KPI) is
almost impossible. Lacks of universally accepted performance indicators in many occasions
hamper mission success (Heaslip, 2012) and raise doubts by donors as to the effectiveness of
their investment (donation). Table 1 summarizes some of the differences between commercial
and relief supply chain management.
Table 1. Similarities and Differences of Main Characteristics between Commercial and Relief
Supply Chain and Logistics
Attributes
Foundation
Metrics
Ownership
Strategies
Funding sources
Planning horizon
Supply chain models
Approach
Demand
Rules of engagement

Commercial
Collaboration
Profitability
Consumers/Shareholders/
Stakeholders
Pro-active
Retained earnings, Debt, Equity
Long-term
Push-pull
Pro-active
Predictable
Competitive environment

Relief
Coordination, Cooperation
Saving lives
NGOs/Donors
Re-active
Donation
None
Pull
Re-active
Unpredictable
Humanitarian principles

Metrics for commercial supply chain is corporate’s profitability/revenue while it is how
many lives are saved and relieved suffering in humanitarian supply chain. In humanitarian relief
operations, there is no pre-determined target to achieve since on-set disasters occur unpredictably
without warnings which makes a long-term planning difficult if not impossible. Speed of
response is often compromised under a degraded logistics infrastructure where roads, ports, and
air fields are in most cases either destroyed or not in working condition. On top of unusable or
non-existent logistics infrastructures, communication networks become disrupted making rapid
deployment of goods and services to the needed areas difficult and in many occasions
impossible.
Fragmented NGOs deployed at disaster areas with no collaboration among players creates
a situation where control and command becomes almost impossible causing gluts of needed
goods in some areas while shortage of critical goods and services in some other areas within the
same disaster region (Pettit & Beresford, 2005). In addition, since most NGOs are interested in
responding to urgent needs in a very short time period (Stage 2), donors seldom interested in the
outcome of their investments. Waste becomes perpetuated as there is no established metrics by
which the outcomes are measured, compared and evaluated. A lack of steady funding
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opportunities especially in Stage 1 (preparedness) makes it even harder to optimize the scarce
resources to maximize the outcome (saving lives) per dollar invested.
Commercial supply chain often uses both forecasting (push model) and market demand
driven plan (pull model) to optimize their supply chain operations. With data analytics, demand
based forecasting (pull model) is feasible now than ever in commercial supply chain. However,
in humanitarian supply chain, forecasting disaster occurrences (push model) is almost impossible.
React to disasters has been the norm than exception in humanitarian relief history. Accordingly,
they have to rely exclusively on demand pull response. As a result, it is not uncommon to
witness gluts in some disaster areas and shortages in other places.
DESIGNING HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN
Network design in humanitarian supply chain in general and preparedness stage (Stage 1)
in particular is a challenging task since future event is unknown and therefore uncontrollable
(Simchi-Levi, 2010). Risk management principles may guide us with a basic framework for
network design under extreme uncertain environments. Risk management calls for defining the
nature of risk, assesses the likelihood, estimates economic/human costs and prepares mitigating
strategies. In humanitarian supply chain, types of disaster include flood, tsunami, earthquake,
famine, and other nature induced disasters that result in economic and human suffering.
Although it is difficult to forecast with reasonable accuracy the likelihood of such disasters
occurring, records exist indicating prevalence of such occurrence in certain areas/regions more
than others (e.g. famine in Africa, tsunami in Indian ocean, flood in Southeast Asia and the
Caribbean region, and earth quacks in Japan, etc.). Monte Carlo model may estimate with
reasonable accuracy the likelihood of occurrences (Mooney, 1997; Banomyong & Sodapang,
2012). Mitigating strategies may be followed and in place.
Based on the existing literature, we argue that humanitarian supply chain consists of three
sequential phase; preparatory phase (Stage 1), operational phase (Stage 2) and reconstruction
phase (Stage 3). We propose that Stage 1 is further segmented into three parallel stations;
educational and training station, requirements for within 72 hours disaster station, and
requirements beyond 72 hours disaster station. Summary of sequential and parallel roadmap is
shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 below.
Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Preparedness

Relief operation

Reconstruction

Figure 1. Humanitarian Supply Chain Model
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Stage 1
Preparedness

Station A
Education and
Training

Station B
Within 72 hours

Station C
Beyond 72 hours

Figure 2. Preparedness Stage
History of disaster recovery shows that the recovery effort would be much more effective
and successful if humanitarian relief organization invest in the preparedness phase of relief
operations (Stage 1) (Wakolbinger & Toyasaki, 2011; Petti, et al., 2011). Without firm and wellthought out planning in Stage 1, recovery efforts may not achieve the maximum goals and
targets.
Investing in Stage 1 requires three areas of preparation as shown in Figure 2; education
and training of personnel (Station A), preparing essential items within 72 hours from disaster
(Station B) and beyond 72 hours (Station C). Disaster areas/regions are unable to handle/manage
massive international relief aid unless infrastructure is in place ready for receiving, storing, and
distributing essential goods and services and evacuating and treating the wounded.
Educating and training relief personnel (Station A). In order to prepare and execute
relief operations, trained professionals should be in place for the task. Foremost, logisticians
should be trained who can direct efficiently and effectively urgently needed essential goods and
services to the disaster areas. It should always remind us that 60 to 80% of the total relief fund is
spent on logistics related areas. Well thought out strategies for recruitment, retention and career
planning in this area must be developed (Heaslip, 2012). Medical and health professionals should
be located, recruited and retained for emergency calls. Since the urgent need is to save lives,
emphasis should be in the areas of emergency medical response at this stage. Along with medical
and health related personnel, engineers need to be trained and educated for disaster relief
operations especially in repairing bridges, roads and air fields to transport needed items to the
disaster areas. Modern communication personnel should be also trained and retained with the
most advanced portable equipment available. Finally, personnel in the command and control
field should be adequately trained to maintain safety and security of relief personnel as well as
people affected by the disaster.
Preparing immediate needs (Station B). Needs for immediate relief become critical
within 72 hours from the on-set disaster. Infrastructure is destroyed, communication networks
are disrupted cutting off vital information with the rest of the international communities,
transportation networks are degraded and unusable, availabilities of basic human needs such as
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food, water, medicine, clothing, blankets, etc. either unavailable or destroyed. Banomyong and
Sodapang (2012) in their supply chain response model proposed a timeline response to relief
efforts in each activity. According to their simulating model, information flow to trigger
response should take place within 3 hours, coordinating mechanism within 13 hours, physical
flow within 22 hours, and clearance activity within 37 hours making total responding time within
72 hours. Most importantly, a spirit of collaborative formation can be launched at this stage. The
foundation of any supply chain including humanitarian should be rested upon collaborative spirit
among the key players. No better place to initiate and engage this process than in Station A
(Kovacs & Spens, 2007). Success of humanitarian relief efforts depends on a large extent to how
well each country in general and countries known to be vulnerable to natural disasters in
particular prepare for potential disasters. Investment into and funding for the preparation stage
will minimize human suffering during relief operations (Stage 2) and speed up recovery efforts
(Stage 3). Although no one can predict the types and extent of disasters in the future, literature
indicates there are a few items essential for survival within a short period of time (usually 72
hours) and beyond until massive international relief arrives.
Essential items within 72 hours (Station B). According to Schulz and Heigh (2009), the
Logistics Resources and Mobilization Department (LRMD) of the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC) recommend relief items for a maximum of 5,000 families
within 48 hours and further 15,000 families in 14 days anywhere globally. It includes:
Non-perishable food items (should be sensitive to local customs and culture) (United
Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1993)
Portable drinking water
Clothing and blankets (should be weather sensitive) (Thomas, 2005)
Emergency medical items including hygiene
Battery operating portable communication equipment
Tents (weather sensitive)
Cooking utensils and corresponding fuels
Essential items for beyond 72 hours (Station C). Once immediate needs for survival in
on-set disaster area are minimally prepared and met, and the situation is stabilized, the relief plan
at this stage should direct their attention to preparing sustainable operations within Stage 1 until
outside international aid arrives. The main purpose of operations at Station C is to stabilize the
infrastructure in the stricken areas to prepare for sustainable relief efforts in Stage 2. Important
operational concepts at this stage are to prepare for relief effort beyond 72 hours until massive
international relief aid starts to pour into the affected areas/regions. Some of the items needed for
this stage of operations may include:
Trained security personnel to protect people and road/bridge/air fields
Logistics experts to distribute massive supplies to right places at right moments
Engineers to repair essential roads, bridges and airfields for transfer of urgent relief items
Secured warehousing and distribution facilities to house incoming supplies
Translators/Interpreters who coordinate relief effort with international agencies on the
Ground (Mohman & Jalalzai, 2008)
Light tractors to clear roads and bridges
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Water purifiers and hygiene dispensers
Field hospitals (tent) equipped with emergency surgical operations
Fuel storage tanks
Others
The categories listed above are more or less in line with the US 10 classifications of relief
items (Skoglund & Hertz, 2012).
Local sourcing. Another area that needs to be addressed in Station B is a sourcing
decision. Sourcing for relief management is based on “think global, act local” principle. Local
sourcing is considered preferable whenever possible as it brings local suppliers into the disaster
community where local customs, culture, rules and regulations can be easily incorporated into
sourcing decisions and processes. Products and services in disaster areas become easily adapted
to their needs. In addition, local sourcing helps the local economy that creates relief capacity
where further resources can be drawn (Heaslip & Kovacs, 2016). One study claims that in
disaster relief operations, up to 65 per cent of the costs have been connected to procurement
(Schultz & Soreide, 2008).
Local sourcing also makes it possible to pool resources to take advantages of economies of
scale. Attention should be from “a low-volume, high margin” business towards a “high-volume,
low margin” goods and services under disaster relief sourcing (Ellis, 2011). Finally, local
sourcing provides a rare opportunity where supplier relationship management (SRM) can be
initiated that strengthens the supply chain foundation. As discussed earlier, one of the most
challenging areas in humanitarian supply chain operations is an absence of an avenue where a
solid foundation can be initiated using collaborative spirits among key players. Hastily Formed
Networks (HFN) lack the fundamental principle of collaborative framework and is incapable of
providing value that commercial supply chain would routinely create. Local sourcing may
provide a basic framework where a trust-based collaborative foundation can be established.
Another advantage of local sourcing is that preparation is based on local culture and
custom avoiding unwanted and/or unnecessary relief items brought into the relief areas from
outsiders (U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1993). The cultural issue becomes critical
as both the people affected and the ones helping often come from different backgrounds with
their respective ways of doing (Sohn, Merilainen and Grant, 2016). Concurrence of these two
different cultures and customs could cause unwanted conflicts and resentments.
Although local sourcing provides advantages in many aspects of relief supply chain
operations, it also raises some challenges. If the disasters occur in the same areas/regions where
local sourcing depends on, immediate responses to the needs may be in jeopardy. The situation
may be further complicated when and if the international relief agencies are erroneously under
the impression that essential goods and services are available through local relief sourcing.
International relief effort may be delayed causing further agony and suffering.
Transportation and warehousing strategies. Designing for ideal distribution centers/
warehousing locations is not an easy task since disasters erupt with no advanced warnings.
However, the sites should be in such areas away from suspected locations such as foothills of
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mountains and banks of river where flood may overwhelm facilities. In addition to distribution
facilities in local/regional areas, the floating warehouse concept should be also entertained.
Floating warehouses similar to Doctors Without Borders business model should be strategically
located in the areas/vicinities where likelihood of disaster occurrence is high. Floating
warehouses can and should be used as educational and training facilities as well during the nonemergency period. Since the concept is “floating”, accessibility to this educational facility is
economical and effective.
Transportation network using local assets should be mapped, and essential food, water,
medical items and other basic items should be identified and properly located throughout
potentially affected areas. Postponement strategy may be initially deployed for some of the
necessities such as tents, cooking utensils, blankets, etc. until a clear picture emerges as to the
extent and nature of disasters become known (Heaslip & Kovacs, 2016). Considering the extent
of initial capital investment in this stage, vendor managed inventory (VMI) strategy should be
considered to mitigate capital requirement (Christopher & Tatham, 2011).
Military relief involvement. There is some debate whether military rescue operations at
this stage (Stage 1-B) is appropriate and even desired. Since some countries especially
underdeveloped countries do not have the capacity to prepare for any potential disaster, military
involvement seems to be a very attractive alternative. Military can quickly deploy to any disaster
area worldwide within 48 to 72 hours (Seipel, 2011). In addition, the military has three most
important assets that civilian relief agencies may not have; command and control,
communication networks and fleet of transportation. However, military involvement at this stage
raises a question of the “impartiality” principle in rules of engagement. Potential gains from
military involvement at this planning stage should be carefully weighed against a possible
negative effect that may derail the entire relief process.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Humanitarian supply chain has not performed well as expected in the past due to a poorly
understood concept of supply chain foundation. As a result, resources from potential donors have
been heavily channeled to relief operations on an ad hoc basis. An absence of a well-coordinated
command and control created the situation where scarce resources have been wasted leaving
unfinished relief business to local communities. Such a short-sighted practice is not sustainable
and humanitarian supply chain has been considered as temporary relief logistics tools.
It is time that we re-think relief supply chain from a sustainable prospective. Pouring
resources into Stage 2 (operations) does not solve fundamental issues. Rather it perpetuates a
culture of deepening the dependency on foreign interventions. Creating local relief
infrastructures (Stage 1) is the best way to address the situation (Jahre & Heigh, 2008). It has
been shown that a $1 investment in Stage 1 often equals to $3 in disaster response (Stage 2)
(Haavisto, Kovascs & Spens, 2006). Investment in Stage 1 may not be an attractive exposure that
donors may want. But this process (investing Stage 1) strengthens the foundation for responding
to the future disasters and encourages the local supply chain community involvement who
eventually takes process ownership. Local ownership is critical in building sustainable relief
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infrastructure consistent with local customs and culture (Phillips, 1993; Mohamand & Jalalzai,
2008).
As Dowty (2011) mentioned, humanitarian aid has failed to reach its potential for relieving
human suffering because all too often problems are poorly articulated and solutions are imposed
by donors without regard to the local cultural imperatives of people in need. It is time for
humanitarian supply chain communities to re-direct their focus from response (Stage 2) to
preparedness (Stage 1) based on supply chain principles.
AGENDA FOR FUTURE STUDY IN HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN/LOGISTICS
Humanitarian supply chain/logistics has performed less than its potentials in spite of huge
international contributions to the events. Several factors have contributed to such less than
optimal performance. Absence of unified command and control created opportunities for many
individual players to act alone in many cases to maximize their own agenda. As a result, shortage
of certain goods and services in one disaster area while a surplus in other areas. A lack of unified
coordination creates wasteful results. Misconception that humanitarian supply chain/logistics
addresses only response to an emergency situation creates imperfect humanitarian relief supply
chain framework. As a result, waste perpetuates and effectiveness of supply chain operations is
in many cases compromised. A sound supply chain concept based on collaborative agreement/
understanding among and between donors, NGOs and recipients needs to be developed under a
grand plan of global relief supply chain/logistics strategies. There are currently over 210 relief
organizations in the world and each has no or limited interaction and coordination with others.
Duplicative services and materials become inevitable under this situation.
Another area that needs to be addressed is understanding of the importance of the
preparedness stage in humanitarian supply chain management. Research has shown that return
on investment in the preparedness stage is higher than investing in the operations stage.
Nevertheless, most global donors are willing to fund only relief operations. As a result, it takes
three times more money to provide the same rescue results. A global educational campaign is
needed to convince the donors of the economics of investing in the preparedness stage of relief
operations.
Regardless of the investment preferences by the donors, it is imperative to establish a
humanitarian supply chain network at local levels. The ownership of such initiatives should be in
local communities supported by international relief organizations. Local ownership is critical to
improve the relief efforts. The scope of preparedness should be such that sufficient relief
materials and services are available within 72 hours of disaster. Local sourcing and an
educational and training system for disaster preparedness also foster the local economy and
community solidarity in relief efforts. International relief organizations should play important
roles in establishing local relief networks through education and training support. A close
coordination between these two groups of relief organizations will lead to a solid supply
chain/logistics foundation where a collaborative framework can be introduced. Once such
framework is in place, the efficiency and effectiveness of relief supply chain achieve their
ultimate goal; relief of human suffering. At which point, sustainable humanitarian supply chain
becomes reality.
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FOOTNOTES
a

There are some differences in concept between cooperation, coordination and collaboration.
Coordination is a process to link each activity without any inherent value (“I do it because I am
told to do so). No feeling and no vision. Cooperation is a voluntary action by two players to link
each area of supply chain since the two players see some value for their own company in terms
of cost, price and profit (“I do it because I see some immediate benefits for me”). Collaboration
is a process of creating value for the entire players along the supply chain. Price and cost seldom
enter into this process (“I do it because I see a long-term value for me and for my organization. It
fosters creating trust and produce “serial equity” as opposed to “spot equity”). (Pekman,
Kamauff, & Myhr, 1998).
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